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Abstract. This paper reports on our experiences with verifying auto-
motive C code by state-of-the-art open source software model checkers.
The embedded C code is automatically generated from Simulink open-
loop controller models. Its diverse features (decision logic, floating-point
and pointer arithmetic, rate limiters and state-flow systems) and the
extensive use of floating-point variables make verifying the code highly
challenging. Our study reveals large discrepancies in coverage — which
is at most only 20% of all requirements — and tool strength compared
to results from the main annual software verification competition. A
hand-crafted, simple extension of the verifier CBMC with k-induction
delivers results on 63% of the requirements while the proprietary BTC
EmbeddedValidator covers 80% and obtains bounded verification results
for most of the remaining requirements.
1 Introduction
Software Model Checking. Software model checking is an active field of research.
Whereas model checking algorithms initially focused on verifying models, vari-
ous dedicated techniques have been developed in the last two decades to enable
model checking of program code. This includes e.g., predicate abstraction, ab-
stract interpretation, bounded model checking, counterexample-guided abstrac-
tion refinement (CEGAR) and automata-based techniques. Combined with the
enormous advancements of SAT and SMT-techniques [1], nowadays program
code can be directly verified by powerful tools. Companies like Microsoft, Face-
book, Amazon, and ARM check software on a daily basis using in-house model
checkers. The enormous variety of code verification techniques and tools has ini-
tiated a number of software verification competitions such as RERS, VerifyThis,
and SV-COMP. For software model checking, the annual SV-COMP competition
is most relevant. Launched with 9 participating tools in 2012, it gained popular-
ity over the years with more than 40 competitors in 2019 [2]. It runs off-line in
a controlled manner, and has several categories. Competitions like SV-COMP
have established standards in input and output format, and evaluation criteria.
Software model checkers are ranked based on the verification results, earning
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points for correct results while being punished for wrong outcomes. A more re-
cent development is the usage of witnesses to validate verification results. Results
are provided in so-called quantile plots indicating the required verification time
versus the cumulative score over the benchmarks.
Aims of this Paper. This paper focuses on: how do the SV-COMP competitors
perform on automotive code? and how do these tools compare to proprietary tools
that are tailored to such code? The objective of this paper is to benchmark a
rich set of participating tools in SV-COMP using two case studies from a major
car manufacturer taken from [3]. In contrast to the SV-COMP, where a diverse
set of open-source verification tasks ranging from small academic examples over
concurrent programs up to software systems are submitted by research and de-
velopment groups, we focus on an industrial grade automotive code base. To the
best of our knowledge, such an evaluation has not been made before. While a
set of two case studies is certainly a small benchmark in comparison, the size
of the two case studies (of about 1400 and 2500 lines of embedded C code re-
spectively), its diverse features (decision logic, floating-point arithmetic, pointer
dereferencing, rate limiters, bitwise operations and state-flow systems), the rich
set of (179) requirements, and the availability of verification results obtained by
the proprietary software model checker BTC EmbeddedValidator, make it an
interesting starting point to validate and compare various open-source software
model checkers on an automotive code base.
Approach. We selected 11 software model checkers from the SV-COMP 2019 [2],
based on (a) the aforementioned characteristics of the two automotive case stud-
ies, (b) the requirements that mostly are safety properties, and (c) the availability
of a license that enables an academic evaluation. In addition, we considered a
simple hand-crafted extension of CBMC [4] with k-induction that is tailored to
the control-flow characteristics of the two benchmarks. We conducted two main
experiments. The first experiment runs the 12 software model checkers on the
179 requirements, 99% of which are invariants, and focuses on comparing the
coverage of the tools (how many requirements could be verified or refuted), and
their verification time. The second experiment benchmarks the open-source code
verifiers against the proprietary verifier BTC EmbeddedValidator 3.
Our Main Findings. The main results of this paper are:
– The SV-COMP competitors are able to obtain results for at most 20% of all
requirements. Various competitors covered between 0 and 5% only.
– A hand-crafted, simple extension of CBMC with k-induction covers 63%.
– BTC EmbeddedValidator covers 80% and obtains bounded verification re-
sults for 85% of the remaining requirements.
Our results show that there is a lot of untapped optimization potential for making
existing open source software model checkers more appealing and applicable
to automotive code. Suitable benchmark candidates are currently too closely
guarded by industry to be really driving scientific development. Therefore, the
3 https://www.btc-es.de/en/products/btc-embeddedplatform/
message of this paper is to emphasize the need for a synchronization between
the industrial and scientific software verification communities.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Automotive Benchmarks
Benchmark Description. Both case studies involve auto-generated code of
two R&D prototype Simulink models from Ford Motor Company: the next-gen
Driveline State Request (DSR) feature and the next-gen E-Clutch Control (ECC)
feature. The DSR and ECC features implement the decision logic for opening
and closing the driveline and calculating the desired clutch torque and corre-
sponding engine control torque of the vehicle, respectively. The case studies are
described in detail in [3]. Unfortunately, because of non-disclosure agreements,
we cannot make the benchmarks publicly available; instead we give a detailed
characterization of the used code in the following.
Table 1: Code metrics of the benchmarks.
Metric DSR ECC
Complexity
Source lines of code 1,354 2,517
Cyclomatic complexity 213 268
Global constants 77 274
char 12 8
char[] [12,32] 2 0
float 35 77
float[] [6-12] 9 [2-7] 4
float* 1 1
void* 18 184
Global variables 273 775
char 199 595
char[] [16-32] 3 0
float 46 110
float[] [4-10] 25 [2-4] 70
Operations 5232 10096
Addition/subtraction 133 346
Multiplication/division 52 253
Bit-wise operations 65 191
Pointer dereferences 83 180
Code Characteristics. From
the Simulink models, gener-
ated by a few thousand blocks,
around 1,400 and 2,500 source
lines of C code were extracted
for DSR and ECC. Both code
bases have a cyclomatic com-
plexity of over 200 program
paths. The cyclomatic com-
plexity is a common software
metric indicating the number
of linearly independent paths
through a program’s code. Ta-
ble 1 presents the metrics col-
lected on both case studies.
Constants are used to ac-
count for configurability, i.e.
they represent parameters of
the model that can be changed
for different types of applica-
tions. The configurable state-
space consists of 77 and 274
constants, for DSR and ECC
respectively. Most of them are
of type float, sometimes in a
fixed-length array, as indicated
by the square brackets. Their
size range is also given in square brackets. Additionally, both case studies contain
pointers to constant data (e.g. const void*).
With a couple of hundred variables, globals are heavily employed . They are
used for exchanging data with other compilation units. Here, the char type is
most prevalent, taking up around three quarters of the variable count. float
variables make up the remaining quarter.
The number of operations in the call graph are around 5, 000 and 10, 000 for
DSR and ECC. While linear arithmetic is most prominent, we also observe a
large amount of multiplication and division operations, possibly on non-constant
variables. Challenges for software verifiers rise along with the complexity of oper-
ators used. Pointer and floating-point arithmetic, as well as bit-wise operations
impose challenges. These case studies employ a variety of bit-wise operations
such as >>, &, and |, mainly on 32-bit variables. Such operators can force the
underlying solvers to model the variable bit by bit. A noticeable amount of
pointer dereferences, namely 180 and 83 occurrences, is present in the programs.
Requirement Characteristics. The requirements originate from internal and
informal documents of the car manufacturer and have been formalized by hand.
As described in [3], obtaining an unambiguous formal requirement specification
can be a substantial task. All differences between the formalization in [3] and this
work in number of properties stem from different splitting of the properties. For
the DSR case study, from 42 functional requirements we extracted 105 properties,
consisting of 103 invariants and two bounded-response properties. For the ECC
case study, from 74 functional requirements we extracted 71 invariants and three
bounded-response properties.
Invariant properties are assertions that are supposed to hold for all reachable
states. Bounded-response properties request that a certain assertion holds within
a given number of computational steps whenever a given, second assertion holds.
2.2 The Software Model Checkers
In order to analyze the performance of open-source verifiers on our specific use
case of embedded automotive C code from Simulink models, we selected a suit-
able subset of C verifiers based on the following criteria:
1. Has matured enough to compete in the SV-COMP 2019 [2] in the Reach-
Safety and SoftwareSystems category.
2. Has a license that allows an academic evaluation.
Based on these criteria, we selected the verifiers: 2LS, CBMC, CPAChecker,
DepthK, ESBMC, PeSCo, SMACK, Symbiotic, UltimateAutomizer, UltimateKo-
jak, and UltimateTaipan. The study was conducted in March 2019. We used the
latest stable versions of each tool to that date. We also included CBMC+k (de-
scribed in Section 2.3), a variant of CBMC that enables k-induction as a proof
generation technique on top of CBMC. Let us briefly introduce the selected
open-source verifiers.
CBMC 5.11 [5]. The C Bounded Model Checker is a matured bounded model
checker for C programs. CBMC takes a pre-specified bound up to which the
program loops are unrolled. The resulting transition system is encoded symbol-
ically, and finally passed to an SAT-solver. For a given bound k, this formula
over the program states is created in the following manner, where I is the initial
condition, T the transition relation, si a state and P the property:
BMC k(s0, . . . , sk) = I(s0) ∧
(
k−1∧
i=0
T (si, si+1)
)
∧
(
k∨
i=0
¬P (si)
)
(1)
ESBMC 6.0.0 [6]. The Efficient SMT-based Bounded Model Checker was forked
off of a 2008 version of CBMC and has been replacing original framework parts
ever since. One of its goals is to directly translate to SMT-theories instead of
relying on SAT-solvers. It furthermore supports k-induction. Here, a generalized
mathematical induction is applied to program loops, where a “look-back” of
k steps is allowed for the induction hypothesis. The verification task can be
specified as a formula over the program states:
INDk(s0, . . . , sk) =
(
k−1∧
i=0
T (si, si+1)
)
∧
(
k−1∧
i=0
P (si)
)
∧ ¬P (sk) (2)
2LS 0.7.0 [7]. This is another fork of CBMC that expands from bounded model
checking to a multitude of verification approaches. It interprets program analysis
as a problem of solving a second-order logic instance. This leads to a variety of
concepts that 2ls can employ, including (incremental) bounded model checking,
k-induction, k-induction k-invariants, and abstract interpretation.
CPAChecker 1.8.0 [8]. The Configurable Program Analysis Checker provides a
framework for implementing a rich set of analysis and verification techniques.
By employing an abstract analysis algorithm, it implements concrete approaches
such as predicate abstraction [9], value analysis [10], and k-induction [11].
PeSCo 1.7 [12]. PeSCo is a recent fork of CPAChecker which exploits machine
learning to effectively select a fitting configuration for the given verification task.
DepthK 3.1 [13]. DepthK uses k-induction on top of ESBMC combined with
an invariant-strengthening approach. It supports the iterative proof process by
inferring possibly over-approximating invariants over polyhedral constraints.
SMACK 1.9.3 [14]. Rather than being a verifier by itself, SMACK translates
from the LLVM intermediate representation (IR) into the Boogie [15] intermedi-
ate verification language (IVL). Corral, the default verification back end, employs
bounded model checking with a goal-directed search algorithm.
Symbiotic 6.0.3 [16]. Symbiotic applies program instrumentation, static slicing
and symbolic execution to identify counterexamples. Internally, it uses a patched
KLEE version for symbolic execution and witness generation.
UltimateAutomizer 91b1670e [17]. This tool implements a trace-abstraction
based on automata in a CEGAR fashion. Its development is based on the Ulti-
mate framework which provides access to program representation, code transfor-
mations, and SMT-solvers. It applies a CEGAR scheme until an error automaton
with sufficient abstraction is found.
UltimateKojak 91b1670e [18]. As part of the Ultimate tool chain, UltimateKojak
uses CEGAR with interpolation over multiple program paths.
UltimateTaipan 91b1670e [19]. Similar to UltimateAutomizer, UltimateTaipan
employs automata-based trace abstraction and CEGAR. It uses a fixed-point
iteration to refine error paths until a sufficient precision is reached.
2.3 A Simple, Tailored Variant of CBMC
The SV-COMP verifiers are complemented by a simple, hand-crafted extension
of the bounded model checker CBMC (version 5.11) with k-induction. Our imple-
mentation is tailored to the two case studies, in particular to programs with one
main outermost control loop. Our prime motivation to consider this variant is
to show the effect of a simple, almost trivial, tweak of a bounded model checker.
The main goal of k-induction is harvesting the power of efficient bounded model
checkers such as CBMC for proof generation. In this way, verifiers that natively
only support bug hunting but have matured over time, can be elevated.
extern void __VERIFIER_error();
int main() {
initialize();
while(1) {
step();
if(!property())
__VERIFIER_error();
}
}
 
extern void __VERIFIER_error();
extern void __VERIFIER_assume(int);
int main() {
initialize();
set loop variables nondet();
unsigned int i = 0;
while(1) {
VERIFIER assume(property());
i++;
step();
if(i == k && !property())
__VERIFIER_error();
}
}
Fig. 1: The transformation that is applied in the k-th induction step.
Our implementation CBMC+k is realized by a straightforward code trans-
formation [20], see Fig. 1. It creates a new program representing the induction
step such that all input variables are set non-deterministically on entering the
loop. It then runs the back-end verifier on both the base step – i.e. the input
file – and the induction step. If the base step returns a counterexample, the tool
reports False. In case the induction step returns no counterexample for iteration
k and the base case has also reached k, it reports True. Our two case studies do
not require the forward case in [20], thus simplifying the implementation.
CBMC+k has severe restrictions on its input code. It is targeted to embed-
ded C programs containing one (unbounded) main loop with a strictly bounded
loop body. The property has to be checked at the very end of every loop iter-
ation. Although there exist transformations from general programs to one-loop
programs, we decided to skip this step as our case studies do not exhibit nested
unbounded loops. Evidently, CBMC+k inherits the capabilities (and deficien-
cies) of its back-end verifier, specifically its ability to handle large state spaces.
CBMC+k should thus not be considered a generic, widely applicable exten-
sion of CBMC with k-induction. Our prime motivation to consider this variant is
to show the effect of a simple, almost trivial, tweak on a bounded model checker.
We have taken CBMC for this variant as it performed very well in identifying
counterexamples, an important trait for k-induction.
The CBMC+k implementation is made publicly available at https://github.
com/moves-rwth/cbmc-with-kInduction.
2.4 Experimental Setup
All experiments were performed on a machine with 192 GB RAM and two In-
tel Xeon Platinum 8160 processors, each containing 24 cores at 2.1 GHz. Our
benchmark script executed ten benchmarks in parallel, giving each execution
four CPU cores with a memory limit of 18 GB and a CPU-time limit of two
hours. Further details can be found in the Appendix. Every verification was fol-
lowed by two witness validation runs of CPAChecker and Ultimate. Conforming
to the regulations of the SV-COMP 2019, the time limit for a correctness witness
was two hours, whereas a violation witness had to complete within 12 minutes.
We collected the data points:
– the result; either True, False or Unknown,
– why no definite answer was given, e.g. Timeout, Memout or Verifier bug,
– the used CPU-time, in seconds,
– the peak memory usage, in MB,
– if measurable, the time spent by a SAT solver, in seconds,
– if measurable, the reached depth in a BMC or k-induction setting, and
– the witness validation results; either Correct (validation result = original
result), Invalid (unparseable witness) or Unknown (resource exhaustion, or
validation result 6= original result).
To keep the results comparable and the competition fair, we used the default
configurations that the tool maintainers chose for the SV-COMP 2019 reachabil-
ity tasks. The exact settings can be found in the Appendix. CBMC was invoked
with increasing values of k by a wrapper script similar to the one employed in the
SV-COMP 2019. For the Ultimate tool chain, a bit-precise memory model was
applied4 to the Boogie translator configuration. The witness validation processes
for CPAChecker and Ultimate were set up as in SV-COMP 2019 with scaled run
times where necessary. Due to the aforementioned confidentiality reasons, we
cannot disclose the extracted benchmark data and verifier outputs.
4 by adding Memory model=HoenickeLindenmann Original.
3 Comparing the Open-Source Verifiers
Coverage. Fig. 2 shows the verification results of running the open-source veri-
fiers on the two case studies, omitting the results of the witness validation.
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Fig. 2: The overall result distribution for each software model checker, in percent.
CBMC+k is able to verify about 63% of the verification tasks; CBMC and
UltimateTaipan cover roughly 20%. ESBMC delivers results on 10% of the re-
quirements. The remaining verifiers reach a coverage of at most 5%. The majority
of the verifiers is either able to identify counterexamples or produce proofs, but
seldom both. 2LS and SMACK cannot return a single definite result. The only
successful witness validation was a proof of PeSCo validated by CPAChecker,
indicated by True (Correct). CBMC delivered invalid witnesses on all tasks,
leading it to fail the witness validation process.
Fig. 2 also indicates the reasons for Unknown answers. We observe that
time- and memory-outs prevail, but a large number of verifiers exhibit erroneous
behavior. A detailed description of the latter issues is given in Section 5.
To get insight into which requirements are covered by which software model
checker, Fig. 3 depicts two Venn diagrams indicating the subsets of all 179 verifi-
cation tasks. Each area represents the set of verification tasks on which a verifier
returned a definite result. Those areas are further divided into overlapping sub-
areas, where a number indicates the size of this set. For reasons of clarity, we
included only the top five verifiers for the respective case study, based on the
number of definite answers. For both case studies, there is not one verifier which
covers all requirements covered by the other verifiers. For DSR, CBMC+k cov-
ers all but one definite results of the remaining verifiers. In this case, CBMC
was able to identify a counterexample close to the timeout. CBMC+k exhausts
its resources on this requirement as the inductive case occupies a part of the
available computation time. For ECC, UltimateTaipan, ESBMC, and CBMC+k
together cover the set of all definite results. Note that some verifiers — e.g. Ulti-
mateTaipan and ESBMC — perform rather well on one case study, but lose most
of their coverage on the other. In most of such cases, this is due to erroneous
behavior of the verifier manifesting on just one of the two case studies.
We believe that the substantial difference in verifier coverage for the two case
studies, as seen in Fig. 3, is the result of structural differences in the benchmark
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Fig. 3: Venn diagrams indicating the requirement coverage (i.e., a definite result
was issued) by the top-five verifiers for case study DSR (left) and ECC (right).
code. While the overall control-flow structure (closed loop, step-based input to
output propagation) is the same for DSR and ECC, the difference in overall size
and the higher number of global constants, pointers and floating-point variables
make ECC imposing different challenges. Even a small increase in code size can
lead to verifiers not even getting through costly initial preparatory steps, that,
if completed, might have quickly been followed by a result.
Quantile Plot. As standard in SV-COMP, a quantile plot for the results on both
case studies together is depicted in Fig. 4. Note the log-log scale. To this end,
a score is assigned to each verification run according to the SV-COMP5 scheme
in Table 2.
Table 2: The employed scoring scheme for the quantile plots as adopted from
SV-COMP.
Verification result False True
Validation result 3 ? 7 3 ? 7
Score +1 ±0 ±0 +2 +1 ±0
The score depends on the results of the witness validation which can ei-
ther be validated (verification and validation result coincide, indicated by 3),
not validated (resource exhaustion or verification and validation result differ,
?) or invalid (unparseable witness, 7). In absence of expected verification re-
sults, no punishments for wrong answers are given. In Section 4, we compare
the verification results against those obtained by the commercial verifier BTC
EmbeddedValidator.
The quantile plot in Fig. 4 indicates the accumulated score for all verifica-
tion runs, sorted by ascending run time (x-axis), against the required CPU-time
(y-axis). A (log, log) scale is used for improved readability. As invalid and unval-
idated counterexamples are not rewarded in this score, verifiers returning such
results – 2LS, CBMC, DepthK, SMACK and Symbiotic – obtain a zero score.
Verifiers with a large number of proofs obtain higher scores. As only one witness
could be validated, this aspect plays a negligible role in the scores. CBMC+k
exhibits a higher score than other verifiers; runner-up ESBMC obtains various
5 https://sv-comp.sosy-lab.org/2019/rules.php#scores
results only after one hour. In general, 50% and 90% of the answers were given
within seven and 75 minutes, respectively. Only few verifiers used the full time
limit of two hours: The Ultimate verifiers and CBMC+k obtained many results
within an hour.
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Fig. 4: The quantile (log, log) plot for all verifiers except the tools 2LS, CBMC,
DepthK, SMACK and Symbiotic (as they reach a zero score).
4 Benchmarking Against BTC EmbeddedValidator
To compare the results of open-source software verifiers to a commercial tool, we
additionally ran the verification tasks using BTC EmbeddedValidator (BTC for
short).6 The main purpose of this examination is the establishment of a reference
point. This reference can subsequently be used as a foundation to interpret the
applicability of the open-source verifiers to the industrial case studies.
BTC EmbeddedValidator is part of BTC EmbeddedPlatform, a commercial
model-checking tool developed for industrial applications. It is, among others,
heavily optimized for industrial embedded software — such as the benchmarks
considered in this paper — and unsurprisingly performs very well on the ECC
and DSR case studies. This focus is also a weak point: It can not or not easily deal
with memory allocation and many standard library headers usually not present
in the targeted embedded code, making it unsuitable for a direct comparison
on established SV-COMP benchmarks. Requirements can be specified directly
using a pattern-based approach, see [21, 22]. BTC EmbeddedValidator employs
several back-end tools for verification: CBMC7, iSAT3, AutoFXP, SMIBMC,
and VIS. Code transformation, static analysis, and detection of spurious, i.e.,
incorrect, counterexamples are done as part of the verification.
6 Similar results were provided in [3]. We have used a more recent version of BTC Em-
beddedValidator and considered 179 rather than 112 requirements, as requirements
were split differently.
7 A different, custom version than used in SV-COMP 2019
We used BTC EmbeddedPlatform 2.3p1 under Windows 7 with 4 GB RAM
and an Intel i7-6700HQ with a timeout of two hours. While this setup is using
a smaller CPU and less RAM than our experiment in Section 3 and is therefore
incomparable, it is important to stress that we use the results of BTC only for
deciding the baseline truth and do not depend on the performance (see also 4.2).
4.1 BTC EmbeddedValidator Verification Results
Table 3 states the result distribution for both case studies, in percent of the 105
and 74 verification tasks, respectively.
Table 3: Verification results of BTC EmbeddedValidator on both case studies,
in percent of the 105 and 74 verification tasks.
Case study DSR (105) ECC (74)
Result True False Unknown True False Unknown
Percentage 56.2% 21.9% 21.9% 55.4% 27.0% 17.6%
BTC did not return a result on 21.9% of the DSR tasks; 91% of which were
due to reaching only bounded correctness, but no unbounded proof. BTC timed
out on the remaining 9%. Of the 17.6% Unknown answers for ECC, 92% are
bounded proofs, and 8% timed out. In comparison to the open-source verifiers,
BTC takes first place in both case studies when considering the overall number
of definite answers. As witness output is not available in BTC and wall clock
times were measured, we cannot integrate BTC fairly into our scoring system,
and thus refrain from calculating a quantile plot score. Although we were not
able to determine exact CPU-times from BTC due to tool limitations, a wall
clock time was collected. The average wall clock time of BTC on tasks where
definite answers were returned amounts to 17±4 seconds on DSR and 308±1109
seconds on ECC. Fig. 5 shows the results for all 143 verification tasks on which
BTC returned a definite result. It also indicates conflicts, i.e. different outcomes
than BTC EmbeddedValidator.
4.2 Scores Assuming Correct Results by BTC EmbeddedValidator
In absence of the true verification results, let us assume the results of BTC
EmbeddedValidator as a “ground truth”. As this is a mature industrial tool de-
veloped over many years specifically for such industrial cases considered here,
we believe that this is a reasonable assumption. For this, we restrict the veri-
fication tasks to those on which BTC returns a definite answer. We are aware
of the fact that this is debatable, but given the very low number of verification
results by BTC EmbeddedValidator that could be shown by other tools to be
invalidated (as depicted later), this gives a quite good impression. We would like
to point out that we are not interested in either shaming or praising specific
tools, we simply are trying to provide a look at the “big picture” with respect
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Fig. 5: The verification results for each verifier, in percent of the 143 verification
tasks on which BTC returned a definite result. No witness validation results are
depicted, as they were previously given in Figure 2.
to model checking certain types of industrial embedded code. Our assumption
of using BTC EmbeddedValidator as a ground truth does certainly not imply
the validity of all its results. But, considering the purpose of this section, it
represents a sufficiently precise reference point for a comparison. We update the
quantile plots to now punish wrong results (i.e., results in conflict with BTC) by
−16 and −32 points for wrong violation and proof results, respectively, as in the
SV-COMP. The resulting plots are given in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6: The quantile plot for each verifier, assuming BTC results as ground truth.
The tools 2LS, DepthK, SMACK and Symbiotic have been omitted as they do
not reach a score other than zero.
Compared to Fig. 4, the scores of CBMC+k are substantially worse as it
has three conflicts with BTC EmbeddedValidator. This is due to the fact that
the SV-COMP punishment scheme is bad for verifiers returning many results
of which some are wrong. It is almost as good (in terms of the scoring scheme)
to not generate any result at all (and thus no “wrong” result). This effect is
certainly important when witness validaation is seldom, as it is the case in our
setting where only one witness could be validated. CBMC+k produced definite
verification results on many of the requirements, and consequently has a higher
chance of producing a conflicting result. With conflicts being punished heavily
and non-validated answers that are deemed correct not being accounted for
much, the accumulated score of a verifier returning many definitive results some
of which are wrong has a high chance to score worse than a verifier returning a
small number of results. Fig. 7 presents updated Venn diagrams when removing
all results that are in conflict with BTC.
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Fig. 7: Venn diagrams indicating the requirement coverage (i.e., a definite result
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assuming BTC results as ground truth.
We did a careful comparison of the verification results of all verifiers. Our
findings are summarized in Table 4. For the ECC case study, the verifiers gave
contradicting answers for 18 requirements, i.e., about 24% of all requirements.
UltimateTaipan finds violations in 16 cases, while no verifier confirms these refu-
tations. There were no conflicts between the open-source verifiers for DSR. Three
conflicts were however encountered with BTC EmbeddedValidator. In two cases,
CBMC (and CBMC+k) found a counterexample at depth two, conflicting a
bounded proof of BTC EmbeddedValidator of depth 10. As these requirements
involve equality of floating-point numbers, there seems to be a subtle issue behind
this. This can be related to different intermediate floating-point precisions being
used (e.g. 64 or 80 bits) and allows for multiple different, albeit correct, con-
flicting results. No witnesses could be validated for any conflicting requirement,
meaning that we do not have a correct measure of identifying correct answers.
Because of the high complexity of the involved C code, we refrained from manual
analysis. While we strongly believe in the importance of witness generation and
-verification, especially in industrial applications, we want to point out that in
this case, the exact results are of reduced interest — we rather want to convey
the overall big picture of how well the selected open source model checkers are
optimized towards real-world industrial applications.
5 Encountered Issues
During the course of this work we identified issues and bugs in most of the ver-
ifiers. In case we were able to identify a minimal working example, we reported
Table 4: The contradicting results observed in DSR and ECC, respectively.
Case study True False Count
DSR
CBMC+k BTC 1
BTC CBMC, CBMC+k 2∑
= 3
ECC
BTC UltimateTaipan 7
BTC, CBMC+k UltimateTaipan 4
BTC, ESBMC, CBMC+k UltimateTaipan 4
BTC, ESBMC UltimateTaipan 1
ESBMC, CBMC+k DepthK 1
ESBMC BTC, UltimateTaipan 1∑
= 18
bugs to the developers as noted in the footnotes below. We give a brief descrip-
tion of the occurring issues. Issues encountered with earlier versions of BTC
EmbeddedValidator have been described in [3].
CBMC 5.11. We encountered a bug that presented itself on the code outputted
by Frama-C [23], which led CBMC to report spurious counterexamples. In version
5.11, CBMC did not handle variables that are local to a switch block correctly
and always assumed a non-deterministic value for them8. This bug has been
fixed in subsequent releases. Additionally, when employing CBMC 5.9 or larger
for CBMC+k we noticed a drop in performance for the inductive steps compared
to version 5.8, sometimes resulting in resource exhaustion for the 5.11 version.
This behavior was not emerging in the base cases, i.e., it most likely corresponds
to the introduced non-deterministic state spaces, although we were not able to
identify a specific cause. Lastly, CBMC outputs witnesses that do not adhere to
the format specification9.
ESBMC 6.0.0. On DSR, we observed a verifier bug on 97.1% of the verifica-
tion tasks. Here, ESBMC seems to specify a faulty input for its default SMT
solver, Boolector. Specifically, it appears to create if-else branching conditions
of different sorts. This problem could be avoided e.g. by using Z3.
2LS 0.7.0. We identified a simple program on which 2LS delivers false negatives,
consisting of two nested loops and a VERIFIER error() statement after the
inner loop. 2LS reports such a program as safe with its k-induction setting10.
Apart from this, 2LS did not execute on any verification task. This seems to be
due to a bug in a bit-vector map implementation, where a size assertion fails.
CPAChecker 1.8.0. C typedefs were not resolved correctly11. This bug initially
prevented the tool from running on the case studies completely, although it
was quickly fixed by the tool developers. Furthermore, we found that switch-
local variables, similar to CBMC, are not represented internally at all, and thus
ignored12. As we tried to run CPAChecker with Z3, we were deterred by a bug
in the Z3-abstraction of JavaSMT13.
8 https://github.com/diffblue/cbmc/issues/3283
9 https://github.com/diffblue/cbmc/issues/4418
10 https://github.com/diffblue/2ls/issues/123
11 https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/cpachecker-users/wTqHOedBOb0
12 https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/cpachecker-users/_bH55x_INOw
13 https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/cpachecker-users/6wv6fgwHnk4
DepthK 3.1. Due to the bug exhibited by ESBMC (see above), DepthK did
not execute on most of the verification tasks. Here, it creates ESBMC instances
which immediately fail until DepthK reaches the time out.
SMACK 1.9.3. SMACK did not return a single definite answer, most likely due
to the default loop bound of one.
Symbiotic 6.0.3. For both case studies, there are some properties for which
KLEE prints that it is silently concretizing an expression to value 0 due to float-
ing points, which leads to Symbiotic failing the verification. Additionally, KLEE
extracted some spurious counterexamples that it could not replay. Symbiotic
stops the execution thereafter.
UltimateAutomizer 91b1670e. We observed two verification runs where Ulti-
mateAutomizer is unable to convert an assertion to an internal function repre-
sentation. There are 40 ECC verification tasks leading to erroneous behavior. In
38 cases the usage of an unknown enum constant leads to program abortion. The
remaining two instances are identical to the described bug on DSR.
UltimateTaipan 91b1670e. On DSR and ECC, the same two conversion error
instances as for UltimateAutomizer apply.
6 Epilogue
This paper reported on applying 12 software model checkers to two embedded
C code case studies from the automotive domain. Although this is a rather
limited set of case studies, our findings give some observations that we hope
to be insightful for the software verification community. From the fact that the
open-source verifiers cover in the best up to 20% of all requirements — about
99% of them being invariants — makes clear that there seems to be a serious gap
between the needs of automotive code verification and open-source software model
checker capabilities. The specific characteristics of the two case studies (many
floating-points, pointer dereferencing, bitwise operations etc.) are certainly a
decisive factor in this respect. Additionally, the structure of an infinite outer
loop (forever processing inputs) with nested finite loops seems to require an
tailored k-induction to properly capture behavior, which we believe explains
part of the success of CBMC+k and BTC. While both tools are heavily tailored
towards special use-cases and are unsuitable for more general programs, we firmly
believe these optimizations are worth pursuing and integrating into mainstream
open-source verifiers. Admittedly, the fact that our benchmarks are not publicly
available is a weak point. More studies like the one in this paper are needed.
To that end, the software model checking community and industrial partners
covering various application domains should take up an orchestrated effort to set
up a substantial set of industrial benchmarks. The only way to meet the needs
in industry is to be able to apply software model checkers on real industrial
software of different domains. Finally, the results of our study (particularly,
the score of CBMC+k relative to BTC) suggest to revisit the scoring scheme
of verification competitions such as SV-COMP . In particular, the punishment
of wrong verification results is too severe; it is currently measured in absolute
terms (the number of wrong answers), whereas a relative judgment (what is the
percentage of wrong answers that a verifier obtained) seems to be more fair.
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Appendix
Although powerful benchmarking tools, e.g. BenchExec14, exist, our infrastruc-
ture forced us to use a custom benchmark script15. Despite not being as powerful
and versatile as BenchExec, it still provides the following basic functionality: Ex-
ecuting multiple verification runs in a parallel fashion, assigning exclusive CPU
cores to each run via taskset, restricting memory and CPU-time of each run
while controlling for possible parallelism of the verifiers by using timeout16, tak-
ing measurements of time and memory from the output of timeout, interpreting
verifier output, and storing the data in a CSV file.
Our setup does not control for hyper-threading on the employed Intel CPUs,
as this feature was disabled on our infrastructure. Possible influences between
processes are mitigated by using distinct cores for each verification run. The
following tool configurations and parameters were used:
2ls --32 --heap-interval --k-induction
cbmc --stop-on-fail --32 --unwindset main.0:k
cpa.sh -stats -32 -timelimit 999999s -heap 18G -spec reach.prp
-svcomp19
depthk.py --force-check-base-case -a 32 -t 7200 --solver boolector
--prp reach.prp --extra-option-esbmc=’--floatbv
--context-bound 2’
esbmc --no-div-by-zero-check --force-malloc-success
--state-hashing --no-align-check --k-step 2 --context-bound 2
--32 --floatbv --k-induction --no-pointer-check
--no-bounds-check --interval-analysis --unlimited-k-steps
kinduction.py --config ../config/cbmc.yaml --variable-moving
--ignore-functions-for-variable-moving updateVariables
pesco.sh -stats -32 -heap 18G -spec reach.prp -svcomp19-pesco
smack --clang-options=-m32 --float -v --bit-precise --time-limit
7200
symbiotic --32
Ultimate.py --data data --config config --spec config/svcomp-
Reach-32bit-Automizer Bitvector.epf --architecture 32bit
Ultimate.py --data data --config config --spec config/svcomp-
Reach-32bit-Kojak Bitvector.epf --architecture 32bit
Ultimate.py --data data --config /config --spec config/svcomp-
Reach-32bit-Taipan Bitvector.epf --architecture 32bit
The file reach.prp contains CHECK(init(main()), LTL(G ! call( VERIFIER
error()))).
For CPAChecker and PeSCo, the svcomp19 and svcomp19-pesco configurations
were scaled for our specified run times, meaning that each configured time limit
was multiplied by eight. For CBMC, k was replaced by increasing values.
14 https://github.com/sosy-lab/benchexec
15 https://github.com/lu-w/benchmarking-verifiers-for-automotive
16 https://github.com/pshved/timeout
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